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INTRODUCTION

Since its creation in 1914, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)1 has
developed into a powerful force for consumer protection in the area of
trade and commerce.' As is true of many federal regulatory agencies, the

1. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976)). The FTC is composed of five Commissioners appointed by the
President with Senate approval for seven year terms. No more than three Commissioners
may be affiliated with the same political party. See id. 15 U.S.C. § 41.
2. See Kintner & Smith, The Emergence Of The Federal Trade Commission As A Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651, 652 (1975). The FTC is
invested with the power to prohibit unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). Under the original act, the FTC could proscribe only unfair methods of competition. See Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 311, §.5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1976)). The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 extended the purview of the FTC to encompass unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. See Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat.
111 (1938) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1914)) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(1)(B)
(1976)). This section was later held applicable to any unfair or deceptive act adversely af-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], No. 3, Art. 17

COMMENTS

19811

FTC may pursue its statutory mandate through case by case adjudication
of alleged violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act or by promulgation of industry-wide rules defining unlawful behavior s Formerly, the
FTC relied almost exclusively on cease and desist orders to enjoin individual violations of the Act.4 The past decade, however, has witnessed a
broad expansion in the use of rulemaking to correct perceived abuses on a
wider scale.' Congress indicated its approval of the increased utilization
of rulemaking in the passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975 (Magnuson-Moss Act).6

Hutchinson Co. v.
fecting consumers regardless of the impact on competitors. See Sperry
FTC, 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); Kintner & Smith, The Emergence Of The Federal Trade
Commission As A Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651, 664
(1975).
3. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976) (adjudication of complaints charging individuals
with commission of proscribed acts or practices) with id. § 57a(a) (promulgation of interpretive rules, policy statements, and specific rules defining prohibited acts). Administrative
agencies may utilize either rulemaking or adjudicatory proceedings at their discretion. See
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7702, 7713; 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:39 (2d ed. 1978);
Nelson, The Politicizationof FTC Rulemaking, 8 CONN. L. REV. 413, 417 (1976). Adjudicative proceedings are initiated by the issuance of a complaint and notice of hearing when the
FTC has reason to believe a violation has occurred. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1980). The party
may be given an opportunity to settle by consent or informal agreement at the discretion of
the administrative law judge (formerly known as hearing examiner) assigned to the case. See
id. § 3.25. Failure to settle results in a formal complaint and trial-type hearing. An initial
decision is rendered by the administrative law judge and it becomes the decision of the
Commission unless a timely appeal is perfected. See id. § 3.46. Review of a cease and desist
order may be obtained before the five-member Commission. See id. § 3.52. Judicial review is
available upon filing a petition in an appropriate court of appeals within sixty days of the
Commission's order. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1976).
5. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(confirming authority of FTC to prescribe substantive rules defining conduct prohibited by
the Act), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Prior to the decision in National Petroleum
Refiners, the FTC had conducted some rulemaking proceedings pursuant to its authority to
make rules and regulations as necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act. See Federal
Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 6(g), 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.

§ 57a(a) (1976));

ADMINISTRATIVE

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

1979 REPORT

39

(1980). Its power to issue substantive, as opposed to interpretive, rules, however, had been
uncertain. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 678 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Nelson, The Politicization of FTC Rulemaking, 8
CONN.

L.

REV.

413, 417 n.13 (1976).

6. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976))
(codifying substantive rulemaking authority of the FTC). Rulemaking is thought to be preferable to individual cease and desist orders for developing broad policy standards and reducing the expense and delay of repeated litigation. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n
v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); H.R. REP. No.
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Similarly, the judiciary has recognized the advantages of rulemaking over
7
adjudication for the purpose of expediting general policy development.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), basic procedural requirements are established for rulemaking and adjudicative proceedings
conducted by federal administrative agencies.' Rulemaking according to
the Magnuson-Moss Act supplements the informal notice-and-comment
provisions of the APA with adversary procedures reserved for adjudica-

93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 7702, 7714.
Trade regulation rule proceedings may be initiated by the Commission or in response to
written petitions from interested persons. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.9 (1980). An initial notice of
proposed rulemaking is published in the Federal Register and includes a description of the
proposed rule and relevant issues; the reason for the rule stated with particularity; and an
invitation to the public to comment and propose issues for consideration. See id. § 1.11.
After reviewing written submissions, the FTC publishes a final notice designating issues to
be investigated at an informal hearing. See id. § 1.12. The presiding officer shall conduct or
permit cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal evidence on disputed issues of specific fact which cannot otherwise be fully disclosed and resolved. See id. § 1.13(d)(5). Upon
review of the rulemaking record, the Commission may issue or decline to issue a rule. See id.
§ 1.14(a). A final rule must be accompanied by a Statement of Basis and Purpose and published in the Federal Register. See id. §§ 1.14(a), (c). Judicial review may be obtained in
accordance with the substantial evidence standard. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(A) (1976).
7. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 690-91 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (rulemaking more expeditious and efficient and more likely to insure compliance because rules more specific in scope), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Walter Holm & Co. v.
Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (rulemaking provides interested persons opportunity to submit their views on the subject); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624,
629 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc) (adjudicative proceedings not well suited for general policy
making). Rulemaking permits the determination of a common issue in a single proceeding as
opposed to adjudication in which the same problem may be frequently litigated. See Fuchs,
Development And DiversificationIn Administrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 83, 94
(1977).
8. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 551 (1976)).
9. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (rulemaking) with id. § 554 (adjudications). Informal
rulemaking requires only that the agency publish a notice of proposed rulemaking and allow
interested persons an opportunity to submit written comments for consideration (noticeand-comment). See id. § 553(b)-(c). Formal rulemaking is mandated when the agency statute provides for rules "to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing
..... " Id. § 553(c). The procedure followed in a formal rulemaking context is identical to
that used for an agency adjudication. Compare id. § 553(c) (formal rulemaking follows procedures set out in sections 556-557) with id. § 554(c)(2) (adjudications utilize procedures for
hearing and decision contained in sections 556-557). Various adversary procedures are afforded the participants including the right to present oral or documentary evidence, submit
rebuttal evidence, and cross-examine as required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.
See id. § 556(d). The decision must be based upon material facts in the record. See id.
§ 556(e). Judicial review is conducted according to the substantial evidence standard. See
id. § 706(2)(E).
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tion and formal rulemaking.10 Such "hybrid" proceedings have developed
out of concern for safeguarding the due process rights of the parties at
interest when specific factual issues as well as policy considerations must
be resolved in the context of informal rulemaking. 11
Since 1975, the Federal Trade Commission has carried out its consumer
protection mandate with particular vigor. 2 Trade regulation rules have
been proposed in response to commercial acts and practices believed to
be deceptive, false, or unfair within the meaning of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'8 A recent example of a major undertaking of the FTC
in the rulemaking area is the children's advertising proceeding which ini-

tially included among its proposals a total ban on all televised advertising

aimed at children. 4 Due to their concern with the expansive rulemaking
authority of the FTC and other administrative agencies, both Congress
and the judiciary have imposed adversary measures's upon informal
rulemaking to insure fair consideration of the factual basis of a proposed
rule."6

10. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (1976) with 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1976). FTC rulemaking is designated "informal," but provides for a hearing at which interested parties have the
right to present oral or written evidence (or both). See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1)(A) (1976).
Additionally, if the Commission determines there are disputed issues of material fact which
must be resolved, the right to cross-examine and present rebuttal is conferred as appropriate to insure a full and true disclosure of the issues. See id. § 57a(c)(1)(B). Cross-examination is contemplated only when there is a bona fide dispute as to issues involving facts
material to the proposed rule. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7728. Material facts are those denominated specific rather than legislative. See S. REP. No. 93-1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7755, 7765.
11. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (cross-examination necessary when general procedures inadequate to ventilate
critical issues); H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7727 (greater procedural safeguards necessary when fundamental
factual premise of rule at issue); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:38 (2d ed.
1978) (factual component of administrative policy making requires procedural protection).
12. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1979 REPORT 43 (1980)
(twenty rulemaking proceedings instituted between April, 1975 and April, 1979).
13. See id. at 43-44. Subjects of proposed rules included prescription drugs, funeral
practices, used cars, food advertising, credit practices, health spas, children's advertising,
and games of chance. See id. at 43-44.
14. See 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (1978) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
15. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (cross-examination); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (crossexamination); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (1976) (cross-examination, rebuttal, and substantial evidence standard for judicial review).
16. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (adversary procedure necessary to test evidentiary basis of rates established by FPC); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (cross-examination required in
EPA proceeding involving resolution of specific technical issues); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1)(B)
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Although a great deal of attention has been directed towards the far
reaching effects of agency rules and the concomitant need for procedural
safeguards, the problem of bias exhibited by a Commissioner in a rulemaking context had not been addressed until recently." In Association of
National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia considered for the first time whether interested parties to an FTC rulemaking proceeding are entitled to the impartial tribunal guaranteed for agency adjudications.' 9 Distinguishing between the two forms of administrative action and the due process
safeguards applicable to each, the court concluded a more rigorous standard for disqualification was necessary when the rulemaking function is
0
involved.

2

This comment will discuss standards for disqualification of FTC Commissioners in the context of adjudicatory and rulemaking proceedings.
The decision in Association of National Advertisers will be evaluated
with respect to prior judicial and statutory developments in administrative law. In conclusion, the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act
of 1980 will be examined in relation to 2the problem of bias and continuing
difficulties with agency accountability. '
II.

THE

Cinderella STANDARD:

GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION IN
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Due process requires that administrative adjudications be conducted in

a fair and impartial manner because of their quasi-judicial nature.2 2 Bias

(1976) (informal hearing and opportunity for cross-examination required in FTC rulemaking
when disputed issues of material fact must be resolved); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-469, § 6, 90 Stat. 2020 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(3) (1976)) (EPA
rulemaking entails informal hearing and opportunity for cross-examination when disputed
issues of material fact must be resolved).
17. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980); cf. Hobbs, Legal Issues in Trade Regulation Rules, 32
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 414, 415-16 (1977) (FTC's role as advocate of proposed rule requires
procedural safeguards lacking in informal rulemaking).
18. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
19. See id. at 1158; cf. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d
583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (due process requires disqualification of administrative adjudicator
who has prejudged facts of case before hearing it); 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1976) (biased employee
may be disqualified from participating in agency adjudication or formal hearing under the
APA).
20. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
21. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58).
22. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306
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or prejudice on the part of a Commissioner or other employee participating in a formal agency hearing is grounds for disqualification under section 556 of the Administrative Procedure Act.2 According to FTC policy,
a request for disqualification is initially left to the discretion of the individual Commissioner charged.2 4 If the request is refused, the motion must
2
be certified to the full Commission for determination of its validity. 5
In Cinderella Careerand FinishingSchools, Inc. v. FTC,26 the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held that FTC Chairman Dixon should
have excused himself from the Commission's review of the hearing examiner's decision.27 Cinderella Schools had been charged with false, misleading, and deceptive advertising relative to its courses of instruction. 28
While the appeal was pending, Dixon made a public speech which the
court said indicated he had prejudged the facts of the case. 29 Noting that

F.2d 260, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Berkshire- Employees Ass'n of Berkshire Knitting Mills v.
NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 238 (3d Cir. 1941).
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1976). Allegations of personal bias or other disqualifying
interests are determined by the agency upon the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit. See id. The decision on the merits becomes part of the record of the case.
See id.; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976) (procedure for disqualifying federal judge). A federal
judge will be disqualified whenever a party to a district court proceeding files a timely and
sufficient affidavit alleging personal bias or prejudice against him or on behalf of the opposing party. See id. § 144. Provided the affidavit states facts legally sufficient to support disqualification, the judge must excuse himself. See Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155, 158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Comment, Administrative Bias:
An Update, 82 DICK. L. REV. 671, 672 (1978). Federal judges are, therefore, more readily
disqualified than administrators acting in an adjudicative capacity since there is no requirement of a decision on the truth of the facts alleged. See United States v. Townsend, 478
F.2d 1072, 1073 (3d Cir. 1973); Comment, Administrative Bias: An Update, 82 DICK. L.
REV. 671, 672 (1978). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976) (federal judge shall be disqualified
upon filing of timely and sufficient affidavit stating personal bias or prejudice) with 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(b)(3) (1976) (agency shall determine issue presented by timely and sufficient affidavit
of personal bias or disqualification of employee participating in formal hearing). Administrative bias is usually manifested as interest, personal bias, prejudgment, and/or legislative
interference. See Comment, Administrative Bias: An Update, 82 DICK. L. REV. 671, 674-86
(1978).
24. See In re Standard Oil Co., 78 F.T.C. 1580, 1581 (1971); In re Kennecott Copper
Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744, 930 (1971).
25. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(g)(2) (1980); cf. United States v. Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072,
1073 (3d Cir. 1973) (federal judge has no discretion in deciding truth of allegations in affidavit of disqualification).
26. See Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
27. See id. at 590-91.
28. See id. at 584 n.1.
29. See id. at 590. Included in the Commission's complaint were allegations that Cinderella Schools made false representations in advertising courses qualifying students to become airline stewardesses and compete in beauty contests. See id. at 584 n.1. In the speech
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an administrative hearing must be fair both in fact and appearance, s° the

court stated that the test for disqualification is whether "a disinterested
observer may conclude that [the decisionmaker] has in some measure
adjudged fhe facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of
hearing it."'" Commissioners may express viewpoints on legal or policy
questions without subjecting themselves to the risk of disqualification."
Similarly, the FTC may issue factual press releases notifying the public of
suspected violations of the FTC Act."s Due process is denied, however,
when a Commissioner engages in public speech or conduct intimating
prejudgment of the facts of a pending complaint.3 4 Accordingly, the Cinderella standard guarantees a fair tribunal when the Commission acts as
a trier of fact in adjudicating the liability of individuals charged with unlawful conduct."
There is no comparable standard dealing with the manifestation of bias
or interest in a rulemaking proceeding under the provisions of either the
APA or the FTC Act.8 6 Informal rulemaking traditionally has been ac-

at issue, Dixon criticized newspapers for "carrying ads that offer college educations in five
weeks . . .or becoming an airline's hostess by attending a charm school .... " He concluded, "their advertising managers are saavy enough to smell deception when the odor is
strong enough." Id. at 590.
30. See id. at 591; Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1962); cf. In
re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (due process requires absence of actual bias and
probability of unfairness from judicial proceeding).
31. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (quoting Gilligan, Will.& Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959)); accord,
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795, 802 (9th Cir. 1966) (disinterested observer standard applicable to statements made by FTC Chairman in previous capacity as chief counsel
to Senate subcommittee); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (public
speech indicated prejudgment that Texaco guilty of price fixing as charged).
32. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 703 (1948) (Commissioners not disqualified
by previous expression of opinion that pricing system at issue was illegal); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1966) (Commissioners may express views on
laws they enforce).
33. See Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc, v. FTC, 404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959).
34. See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (prejudgment found when Chairman in speech on deceptive advertising
referred to Cinderella's advertisements); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 767
(6th Cir. 1966) (Chairman's previous participation in Senate subcommittee investigation involved determination of same facts involved in FTC order); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d
754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (in public speech Chairman discussed prohibited practices specifically mentioning overriding commissions received by Texaco).
35. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir.
1970); accord, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975); American Cyanamid Co. v.
FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 1966); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468-69
(2d Cir. 1959).
36. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, And The Supreme
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corded less procedural protection than litigation

7

because it involves the

resolution of broad policy questions rather than specific disputed facts. 3 8

FTC rulemaking, however, combines informal rulemaking with adversary
procedures to insure that interested parties have the opportunity to challenge the factual basis of a trade regulation rule defining specific acts or
practices violative of the Act.89 Since the Commissioner participating in
rulemaking by the FTC is increasingly called upon to decide disputed
factual issues, the question arises whether the prejudgment standard articulated in 4 Cinderella
is applicable to hybrid rulemaking as well as
0
adjudication.

III. Association of National Advertisers: The "Unalterably Closed
Mind" Standard
In 1978, in response to petitions from several consumer organizations,"
the FTC instituted a major trade rule proceeding to propose certain restrictions upon television advertising directed toward children.42 Citing
dental health risks connected with consumption of sugared food products
as the impetus for the proceeding, 48 the Commission invited public comment on the advisability of a rule banning all televised children's adver-

Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 408-09 n.255 (1979) (expression of bias or prejudice in
rulemaking not specifically addressed by APA).
37. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 239 (1973) (type of hearing
depends on whether rulemaking involved or adjudication of particular disputed facts); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (APA distinguishes between proceedings for promulgating policy-based rules and for adjudicating disputed facts in particular
cases); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc)
(rulemaking lisues not dependent on resolution of evidentiary fact as to which veracity of
witnesses is important).
38. See American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (rulemaking
concerned with broad policy questions rather than review of individual conduct). But cf. 2

K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 7:2, at 7 (2d ed. 1978) (rulemaking often difficult

to distinguish from adjudication).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1)(B) (1976) (cross-examination appropriate for full and true
disclosure of disputed issues of material fact); H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7727 (informal procedures of APA
inadequate when fundamental factual premises of rule in dispute).
40. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, And The Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 408-09 n.255 (1979) (difficult to determine what standard of
conduct governs since FTC rulemaking has many characteristics of formal adjudication).
41. See 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (1978) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). Petitions
were received in April, 1977, from Action for Children's Television and the Center for Science in the Public Interest. In February, 1978, a third petition was submitted jointly by
Consumers Union of America and Committee on Children's Television. See id. at 17,968 n.2.
42. See id. at 17,967.
43. See id. at 17,968.
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tising. 44 To expedite rulemaking, the FTC announced it would conduct an
informal legislative-type hearing followed by an adversary hearing to resolve any disputed issues of material fact.45
Prior to the initial hearing, the Association of National Advertisers and
other interested parties moved to disqualify FTC Chairman Pertschuk
from the rulemaking proceeding." They alleged his public statements indicated he had prejudged specific factual issues involved in determining
whether advertising to children was an unfair or deceptive practice.' 7 Although the petition was denied by the FTC,' 8 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on appeal held the Cinderella standard applicable to rulemaking and enjoined Pertschuk from further participation in the proceeding. ' The court noted FTC rulemaking was of a
hybrid nature with both legislative and adjudicative elements.50 Since the
proceeding was not confined to general policy considerations, but contemplated the resolution of disputed factual issues,5 1 in the court's view, pre-

44. See id. at 17,969-70. One of the issues designated for comment in the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking was whether television advertising directed to, or seen by, young children was unfair and/or deceptive because of their inability to evaluate it. See id. at 17,969.
Additionally, the issue was raised whether restrictions on children's advertising would be
constitutionally permissible in view of the First Amendment protection of commercial
speech. See id. at 17,970; cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizen's Consumer Council,

Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (state may not suppress commercial speech which is truthful
and not misleading).
45. See 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967-68 (1978); cf. 40 C.F.R. §§ 750.7-.8 (1980) (EPA employs
same two-stage approach in rulemaking under the Toxic Substances Control Act); Comment, JudicialReview Of Generic Rulemaking: The Experience Of The NuclearRegulatory
Commission, 65 GEO. L.J. 1295, 1304-05 (1977) (NRC successfully employed similar procedure in rulemaking involving heavy emphasis on specific facts).
46. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 3011 (1980). Other interested parties who joined in the petition were the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the American Advertising
Foundation, the Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc., and the Kellogg Company. See id. at
1155.
47. See id. at 1155. In various public statements, Pertschuk referred to "the evils we
see in children's advertising," "the moral myopia of children's advertising," and the "unfairness of advertising aimed at children." He also accused advertisers of "manipulation" of
children's attitudes and "exploitation" of the child's trust. See id. at 1189. In a speech to
the Action for Children's Television Research Conference on November 8, 1977, Pertschuk
stated, "[6only a ban on the advertising of those products directed towards the young child
can remedy their inherent defect .. " Id. at 1190.
48. See id. at 1155 (Pertschuk not participating). Pertschuk previously had declined to
remove himself, stating disqualification standards for rulemaking and adjudication were not
the same. See id. at 1155.
49. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996, 999 (D.D.C.
1978), rev'd, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 3011 (1980).
50. See id. at 997.
51. See id. at 997; cf. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741
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judgment of the factual basis of the final rule would amount to a denial of
due process.52 Chairman Pertschuk's "conclusory statements of fact" and
"emotional use of derogatory terms and characterizations" with respect to
children's advertising were deemed a more compelling show of bias than
53
was necessary to warrant disqualification under Cinderella.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Cinderella standard was intended only to guarantee an impartial decisionmaker in an adjudicative hearing." According to the court's reasoning, adversary procedures supplementing the basic notice-and-comment
requirements of informal rulemaking do not obliterate the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking. 5 Although FTC rulemaking may require the resolution of certain factual issues, as in an adjudicative hearing,56 the court noted that the former are usually of a general type related
to a future course of conduct as opposed to the past conduct of specific
parties.57 Due to the policy component of rulemaking, the court recognized it may be impossible to achieve factual accuracy in the formulation
of trade regulation rules." Parties affected by rulemaking, therefore,
should not be entitled to the same degree of due process as those whose

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7727-28 (FTC rulemaking may involve resolution of

factual as well as policy issues).
52. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996, 997-98 (D.D.C.
1978), rev'd, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).

53. See id. at 998.
54. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980). "The Cinderella view of a neutral and detached
adjudicator is simply an inapposite role model for an administrator who must translate
broad statutory commands into concrete social policies." Id. at 1168-69.
55. See id. at 1160 (characterization of FTC rulemaking as "hybrid" ignores the dichotomy between rulemaking and adjudication established by APA); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598
F.2d 91, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (promulgation of policy-based standards of general applicability constitutes rulemaking, regardless of the procedures utilized).
56. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1162 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (rulemaking involves legislative facts which need not be developed in evidentiary
hearings); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1)(B) (1976) (opportunity for cross-examination and rebuttal
when disputed issues of material fact involved in FTC rulemaking).
57. Compare Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1162 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (legislative facts assist administrators in determining law and future direction of
policy), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980) with 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 15:03, at 353 (1st ed. 1958) (as between immediate parties, adjudicative facts concern who
did what, when, where, how, and why).
58. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1162 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (since administrative judgment involved in promoting rule, complete factual support
may not be possible), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc) (issues involving legislative facts may be incapable of decisive resolution by testimony).
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past conduct may be found unlawful in an agency adjudication." In con-

clusion, the court reasoned the policy aspects and prospective effect of
rulemaking rendered the Cinderella factual prejudgment standard in-

applicable."0 Instead, a Commissioner should be disqualified only when
there has been a clear and convincing showing that the individual has an
"unalterably closed mind" on matters critical to the disposition of the

rulemaking proceeding.61 Classifying Chairman Pertschuk's statements as

merely "discussion and perhaps advocacy" of legal theories supporting
the FTC's jurisdiction over children's advertising, the court declined to

order his disqualification."
Dissenting in part, Judge MacKinnon asserted the "unalterably closed

mind" standard would afford too much protection for a biased decision-

maker, thereby impairing the public's interest in a fair hearing."8 Additionally, he criticized the majority for simplistically identifying all agency
action as either rulemaking or adjudication without considering the special status of hybrid rulemaking under the FTC.6 4 In MacKinnon's view,

Congress intended to provide access to a fair and impartial decisionmaker

in enacting the rulemaking provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act. s s Judge
MacKinnon favored disqualification upon proof by a preponderance of

the evidence that "substantial bias or prejudgment of any critical fact"
precluded fair consideration of the rule in question."

59. Compare Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (due process requires fair trial
in fair tribunal for agency adjudications) and Berkshire Employees Ass'n of Berkshire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 238 (3d Cir. 1941) (when administrator acts as trier of
fact in agency adjudication, he must maintain complete impartiality) with United States v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1972) (oral hearings not mandated when agency
formulates a legislative-type judgment for prospective application) and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (no due process right to hearing for
individual affected by legislative-type administrative action). But cf. Williams, "Hybrid
Rulemaking" Under The Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal And Empirical Analysis,
42 U. Cm. L. REv. 401, 409 n.28 (1975) (despite future effect, rules may penalize past investments far more than fine levied in adjudicatory context).
60. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
61. See id. at 1170.
62. See id. at 1174. Shortly after the decision was rendered, Pertschuk voluntarily withdrew from the proceedings because of his concern that continued participation would become the focal point of proposed legislation to prohibit the FTC from issuing a children's
advertising rule. See Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1980, at 18, col. 2.
63. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1181 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
3011 (1980).
64. See id. at 1184 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
65. See id. at 1189 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
66. See id. at 1197 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). MacKinnon thought disqualification virtually impossible under the majority standard. See id. at
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IV.

THE INFLUENCE OF

Vermont Yankee

For many years, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has led the development of the "common law of administrative
procedure. 6' 7 In the interest of fairness to parties affected by administrative action, the D.C. circuit has expanded what it considered to be the
minimum requirements of the APA. 6 By contrast, the Supreme Court
has adhered to a strict interpretation of the APA" to encourage agency
resort to the more expeditious rulemaking proceeding.70 Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.7 1 provded an opportunity for the Supreme Court to chastize the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals for exceeding its judicial function by requiring the agencies to follow rulemaking procedures not authorized in the
72
APA or the applicable statute.

The Vermont Yankee holding may have influenced the outcome in
Association of National Advertisers in which the D.C. circuit opted for

1196-97 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in'
part and concurring in part).
67. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, And The Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 368 (1979).
68. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (cross-examination
may be required in FAA rulemaking to satisfy basic considerations of fairness); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasonable crossexamination may be required to ventilate adequately the issues in EPA hearing); American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc) (CAB's provision for oral
comment in rulemaking proceeding insured fair hearing).
69. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973) (ICC not required to provide trial-type hearing in rate-making proceeding when informal APA provisions sufficient to satisfy "hearing" requirement in ICC statute); United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972) (provision for "hearing" in Interstate Commerce Act did not require adjudicatory hearing under APA when promulgating car service

rules).
70. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, And The Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 381 (1979).
71. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The court of appeals had invalidated a rule issued by the
Atomic Energy Commission for failure to utilize hybrid procedures such as cross-examination to resolve the critical issue of nuclear waste disposal. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 541 (1978). There had
been, however, full compliance with the informal rulemaking provisions of the APA. See id.
at 541; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
72. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) (court should not be allowed to impose own idea of which procedures best further public good). The Supreme Court asserted section 553 of the APA established the "maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures." See id. at 524; 5 U.S.C.

§ 553 (1976). But cf. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATivE

LAw TREATISE

§ 6:37, at 611 (2d ed. 1978)

(Vermont Yankee generalization not reliable guide for future role of courts in rulemaking
area since opinion too broad and without supporting authority).
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promoting informal rulemaking" in lieu of extending the Cinderella standard without statutory authorization.7 4 Had it been so inclined, however,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals might have found the Cinderella standard applicable under the "constitutional constraints" exception
to Vermont Yankee. 7 For example, the District of Columbia District
Court in its review of Association of National Advertisers based its order
of disqualification upon a denial of due process.s In the alternative, the
court of appeals might have followed the rationale that Congressional
adoption of certain adjudicative procedures for FTC rulemaking manithe disqualification standard for agency adjudicafested an intention 7that
7
tions should apply.
V.

EROSION OF THE STRICT RULEMAKING-ADJUDICATION DICHOTOMY

The holding in Association of National Advertisers relies upon the

premise that administrative rulemaking and adjudication are mutually
exclusive functions.7 8 Following the court's reasoning, the distinctive roles

of the administrator in each proceeding necessitate different standards
for disqualification.7 9 In response to the court's conclusion, it may be ar73. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (rulemaking permits more efficient allocation of resources, faster action, and more
specific notice to industries of scope of prohibited activities), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011
(1980).
74. See id. at 1167-68 (although FTC statute authorizes use of trial-type procedures in
rulemaking, Cinderella standard not intended to apply); cf. Cinderella Career & Finishing
Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (prejudgment of the facts is test for
disqualification in adjudicative hearing).
75. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (courts may impose additional procedures if warranted by
constitutional constraints or compelling circumstances); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6:37-2, at 79-80 (2d ed. Supp. 1980) (Vermont Yankee does not prohibit due
process additions to informal rulemaking provisions of APA).
76. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996, 999 (D.D.C.
1978), rev'd, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
77. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (Congress intended participants in Magnuson-Moss rulemaking be accorded fair and impartial consideration of their
evidence), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980); cf. United States Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 584
F.2d 519, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (statutory guarantee of public "hearing" justified court's
prohibition on ex parte contacts to insure meaningful public participation). But cf. Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, And The Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV.
345, 392-93 (1979) (Vermont Yankee holding rejected idea that courts may determine what
procedures are necessary to further Congress' statutory scheme).
78. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1160-61 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (administrative action under APA is either adjudication or rulemaking), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
79. See id. at 1168-69. In his role as an adjudicator, the administrator must be "neutral
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gued that statutory and judicial developments since the enactment of the
APA in 1946 have blurred the once clear dividing line between adjudication and informal rulemaking.80
The addition of trial-type procedures to the informal requirements
of the APA has been the principal cause behind the erosion of the
APA formula for agency rulemaking.8 1 In contrast to informal rulemaking
under the APA, the hybrid model utilized by the FTC contemplates a
more extensive consideration of rulemaking proposals; greater disclosure
of the factual as well as policy basis for a rule; and participation by interested persons in defining crucial matters in dispute for resolution by adversary procedures.ss Although mere inclusion of adjudicative procedures
does not transform rulemaking into adjudication, the FTC model has
assumed somewhat of an adversary cast by design.88 In the interest of
fairness to those parties whose activities may be directly and significantly
affected by a proposed rule, the Magnuson-Moss Act authorizes cross-examination when appropriate to substantiate the factual basis of the rule."
and detached." See id. at 1168; Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d
583, 591 (D.C Cir. 1970). As a policymaker, however, the administrator must engage freely
in discussion of the important issues coming before him. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
80. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (court required EPA to provide opportunity for cross-examination at hearing although EPA statute did not so authorize); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-57
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (court prohibited ex parte contacts between private parties and administrators involved in rulemaking proceeding although APA prohibition applicable only to formal
agency proceedings); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1) (1976) (FTC Act provides some trial-type procedures for informal rulemaking).
81. See 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:9, at 481-85 (2d ed. 1978);
Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A ProposedRelationship Between Administrative Procedures And Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 15, 16 (1977); Kestenbaum, Rulemaking
Beyond APA: CriteriaFor Trial-Type ProceduresAnd The FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 679, 686-87 (1976).
82. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1979 REPORT 40-42 (1980).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1) (1976) (informal rulemaking under FTC Act entails right to
hearing and opportunity for cross-examination and rebuttal on disputed issues of material
fact) with 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (informal rulemaking under APA affords opportunity to
submit written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation).
For a discussion of the special requirements of FTC rulemaking surpassing those of the
APA, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1979 REPORT 40-42 (1980).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7727-28; Hobbs, Legal Issues in FTC Trade Regulation Rules, 23
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 414, 416 (1977).
84. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 7702, 7727 (informal rulemaking procedures inadequate protection for
rights of parties when factual basis of rule in dispute); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1979 REPORT 42 (1980) (cross-examination contributes to more effective and
meaningful rules by testing factual assumptions behind proposal); Kestenbaum, Rulemak-
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Additionally, the Magnuson-Moss Act adopts the substantial evidence
standard for judicial review of trade regulation rules which the APA
reserves for adjudications. 5 As a result, courts are requiring a developed
rulemaking record to substantiate the factual conclusions upon which the
rule is based."
Inclusion of these essentially adversary procedures within informal
rulemaking provisions produces at least two effects which are- antithetical
to the traditional view of rulemaking. First, they impair the advantages of
efficiency and expediency informal APA rulemaking possesses over adjudication.87 Secondly, to a certain extent factual accuracy has become necessary to satisfy substantial evidence review, notwithstanding the policy
aspects of rulemaking."
One area in which the distinction between administrative adjudication
and rulemaking has been virtually eliminated is in the treatment of ex
parte contacts.8 ' Private communications between an adjudicator and an
interested party have traditionally been banned in order to protect the
guarantee of a neutral and unbiased tribunal.' 0 In the context of ruleing Beyond APA: CriteriaFor Trial-Type Procedures And The FTC Improvement Act, 44
Goo. WASH. L. Rim. 679, 689 (1976) (broad authority of FTC necessitates additional procedural requirements to insure fairness in rulemaking). But cf. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under The Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal And Empirical Analysis, 42 U.
Cmi. L. REV. 401, 407 (1975) (factual accuracy may not be desirable in rulemaking because of
value issues involved).
85. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (1976) (FTC trade regulation rules reviewable under
substantial evidence standard) with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976) (administrative adjudications reviewable under substantial evidence standard) and id. § 706(2)(E) (rules promulgated under the APA's informal proceedings reviewable under arbitrary and capricious
standard).
86. See, e.g., American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(natural gas rates established in FPC rulemaking proceeding were supported by substantial
evidence in record as a whole); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(transportation rates established by FPC not supported by substantial evidence in the record when decision based on facts not available to interested parties); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court remanded to agency for
further proceedings when reliability of EPA methodology not indicated in record); cf.
Wright, The Courts And The Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CoRNELL L. RaV. 375, 380-81 (1974) (public interest not promoted by administrators who fail to
consider relevant facts and reasonable contentions of parties to rulemaking proceeding).
87. See Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures And JudicialReview, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 15, 60 (1977).
88. Cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc)
(legislative facts not decisively resolved by testimony).
89. See National Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345, 351 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
90. See, e.g., Boyer, Alternatives To Administrative Trial-Type Hearings For Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 123 (1972);
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making, however, ex parte contacts have been invited as a means of soliciting public opinion on relevant questions of policy."" Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC92 extended the ban on ex parte communications to rulemaking proceedings.9
.
Fairness to the parties involved was again the impetus behind the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Home Box Office.94
Undisclosed communications were deemed to foreclose the opportunity
for response by opposing parties whose interests might be prejudiced
thereby."s Additionally, they may permit the administrator(s) to formulate rules on the basis of nonpublic information while advancing a different policy rationale in the rulemaking record." In the court's opinion
Peck, Regulation And Control of Ex Parte Communications With Administrative Agencies,
76 H~Av. L. REv. 233, 239 (1962); 27 DEPAuL L. REv. 489, 493 (1977). The statutory prohibition on ex parte contacts in formal agency adjudications, however, is fairly recent. See Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 4a, 90 Stat. 124 (1976) (amending 5
U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976)).
91. See Nathanson, Report To The Select Committee On Ex Parte CommunicationsIn
Informal Rulemaking Proceedings,30 AD. L. Rev. 377, 389 (1978) (informal APA rulemaking consistent with advantageous use of ex parte communications); cf. 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-3
(1980) (Administrative Conference of the United States recommendations) (informal
rulemaking benefits from administrative access to information and opinions); 27 DEPAuL L.
RE . 489, 494-96 (1977) (ex parte communications important in enabling free flow of facts
and ideas between agency rulemakers and interested parties).
92. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
93. See id. at 57. Following publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking, agency officials or employees expecting to participate in the decision-making process will be barred
from related discussions with interested private persons, their attorneys, or agents. See id.
at 57. All communications received after the notice is published must be documented and
placed in the public file to permit access and comment from interested parties. See id. at 57.
94. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (fairness and
reasoned decision-making inconsistent with secrecy); Nathanson, Report To The Select
Committee On Ex Parte Communications In Informal Rulemaking Proceedings,30 AD. L.
REv. 377, 395-(1978) (parties may be deprived of right to fair hearing); 1979 Wisc. L. REv.
314, 332 n.93 (1979) (fairness requires rulemaking be "informed, reasoned, and candid").
95. See, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 540
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (right to comment on questions concerning public interest is not meaningful
when agency does not reveal relevant issues and positions); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (representations made in secret communications with agency
can neither be supported nor refuted by participants in rulemaking proceedings); 27
DEPAuL L. REv. 489, 500 (1977) (public cannot rebut or contribute to undisclosed information or reasoning).
96. See United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 541 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (rationale set forth in agency decision questionable when ex parte communications essential to decision reached); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (ex parte communications may result in one administrative record for the public and
reviewing court and another for the agency); Nathanson, Report To The Select Committee
On Ex Parte Communications In Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REv. 377,
394 (1978) (agency conclusion may be based on ex parte communications rather than ratio-

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss3/17

16

Hogan: FTC Rulemaking: The Standard for Disqualification of a Biased Com

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:734

some prohibitions on ex parte contacts in rulemaking proceedings are
warranted to safeguard the due process rights of the parties and facilitate

judicial review of the agency decision.' 7
Development of hybrid rulemaking and the extension of the ban on undisclosed ex parte contacts suggest that administrative rulemaking is becoming more like adjudication on a wider scale. By subjecting rulemaking
to increasing procedural protections, some advantages of the informal
notice-and-comment model created by the APA are lost."8 Reasoned

decision making and fairness to the parties is promoted, however, by the
imposition of adversary procedures in the rulemaking context." Consequently, the ability of the administrator to "translate broad statutory

commands into concrete social policies"100 through informal rulemaking
has been circumscribed by the perceived need to support the factual basis
of the rule by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record and eschew
reliance on undisclosed ex parte communications. The "unalterably
closed mind" standard articulated in Association of National Advertisers

seemingly is based upon the broader, arguably outmoded view of the administrator's rulemaking role. 1 1
VI.

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF

1980

Congressional dissatisfaction with the regulatory zeal of the FTC was

evidenced by the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 19 8 0.101 Criticism was directed at the broad exercise of
rulemaking authority to restrict advertising that was neither false nor de-

nale developed in the record).
97. See National Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345, 351 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 539-41
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
98. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546-47 (1977); Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A ProposedRelationship
Between Administrative Procedures And Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 15, 60 (1977).
99. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
100. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
101. See id. at 1168-70; cf. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-57 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (agency rule must represent reasoned judgment based on supporting material); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNIrrED STATES, 1979 REPORT 43 (1980) (failure to consider
principles behind hybrid rulemaking can adversely affect efficiency, acceptability, and quality of decisions).
102. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374 (1980) (effective date May 28, 1980).
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ceptive but simply unfair in the FTC's view.' 0 The children's advertising

proceeding was singled out as an example of the extent of the rulemaking
power and the resulting potential for abuse. 0'°
Accordingly, the Act imposes certain restrictions upon the authority of

the FTC in order to improve agency accountability.105 Section 11(a)(1) of
the Improvements Act withdraws from the FTC the ability to prescribe
rules prohibiting commercial advertising practices it deems to be un-

fair.'

The immediate effect of the foregoing provision is to restrict the

children's advertising proceeding to the proposal
of rules based upon de7

ception or falsity rather than unfairness. 1
Congressional supervision of the rulemaking process was established in
two major respects. First, an advance notice of proposed rulemaking must
be published in the Federal Register and submitted to the appropriate
House and Senate committees.'"' Following a period for response from
interested parties, but prior to the actual hearings, the FTC will be re-

quired to publish the text of the proposed rule including alternatives.10'
Secondly, all final rules must be submitted to Congress for review and are

subject to a legislative veto in the event of disapproval.110

103. See S. REP. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
& An. NEWS 2268, 2284. Chairman Pertschuk admitted a "vendetta" had been waged
against certain industries in the past. See id. at 59, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2268, 2304 (additional views of Messrs. Schmitt, Goldwater, and Pressler).
104. See id. at 17, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2268, 2284-85
(unfairness doctrine is broad charter for restricting commercial advertising which FTC finds
objectionable); cf. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1979 REPORT 45
(1980) (rules based on novel theories of unfairness or deception created confusion as to
Commission's rationales).
105. See S. REP. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2268, 2285 (Congress intended FTC to reassume traditional function of
identifying false and deceptive or misleading advertising).
106. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252,
§ 11(a)(1), 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (1976)).
107. See id.; S. REP. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2268, 2270. Following the passage of the Improvements Act, the FTC
instructed its staff to recommend alternatives to the unfairness rationale and to draft a new
proposal for children's rulemaking by October 15, 1980. See TRADE REGULATION REPORTS,
No. 444, at 4 (July 1, 1980) (children's advertising recommendations sought from FTC
staff.
108. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252,
§ 8, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1976)). Such notice will contain a
brief description of the area of inquiry, objectives sought, and possible alternatives and will
invite comment from interested parties. A general notice of proposed rulemaking will follow.
See id.
109. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252,
§ 8, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1) (1976)).
110. See id. § 21 (new provision). The constitutionality of the legislative veto is in
CONG.
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In the .1980 Improvements Act, Congress clearly sought to restrain what

it perceived to be the "virtually unbounded" authority of the FTC in the

area of substantive rulemaking.111 As in 1975, additional procedures have
been engrafted onto the basic structure of informal rulemaking to safeguard the rights of individuals affected by the pervasive regulatory pres-

ence of the FTC."' The decision in Association of National Advertisers
contemplates only rare instances in which bias will disqualify a Commissioner from a rulemaking proceeding. Although the new Act does not ad-

dress the issue of bias in rulemaking specifically, the elimination of the
unfairness standard and provisions for Congressional supervision render
more difficult the development of a binding trade rule influenced by a

Commissioner's bias for or against an interested party.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Given the new predominance of rulemaking as the preferred form of
administrative action, concern with Commissioner bias is likely to recur.
Unlike the legislature, the FTC is not subject to political control in the
exercise of its rulemaking power.118 In the interest of "principled deci-

sion-making," additional safeguards have been added to the process of
agency rulemaking. 1" As a result, the new FTC model of rulemaking differs from the traditional APA model in requiring greater participation
and factual accuracy.115
Accordingly, the standard for disqualification from a rulemaking proceeding of the FTC should not invariably be higher than that which is
applicable to adjudications. Fairness to affected parties may in some instances require more protection than the "unalterably closed mind" stan-

doubt. See H.R. REP. No. 96-917, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2309, 2321.
111. See S. REP. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2268, 2269.
112. See id. at 17, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2268, 2284; cf.
Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond APA: CriteriaFor Trial-Type ProceduresAnd The FTC
Improvement Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679, 689 (1976) (administrative agencies now
affect rights throughout economy and society); Nelson, The Politicization of FTC Rulemaking, 8 CONN. L. REV. 413, 414 (1976) (additional procedures provide protection against
administrative action contravening general will).
113. Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915) (power of vote is only protection against general statutes with adverse effect on persons or property) with Mayton, The Legislative Resolution Of The Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem In Agency Rulemaking, 1980 DuKE L.J. 103, 107 n.20 (1980) (administrative agencies not subject to direct political control).
114. O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
115. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1979 REPORT 42-43
(1980).
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dard can afford.11 In these cases, perhaps the standard can be tailored to
the factual issues and parties involved.117 Alternatively, the FTC Improvements Act of 1980 may reduce the potential for internal bias by subjecting the Commission to greater controls in the exercise of its rulemaking authority. Ultimate solutions should seek to preserve the FTC's role
in consumer protection while ensuring that rules are formulated in a fair
and informed manner befitting the public interest."'8

116. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1196-97 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (majority standard imposes
"a practically impossible impediment" to disqualification for bias), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
3011 (1980). MacKinnon suggests a test based on a showing by the preponderance of the
evidence that the administrator was unable to participate fairly in rulemaking because of
"substantial bias or prejudgment of any critical fact that must be resolved ... " See id. at
1197 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
117. Cf. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(supporting ban on ex parte communications when rulemaking involves "conflicting private
claims to a valuable privilege"); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1267,
1314 (1975) (procedures utilized in rulemaking should depend on interests involved, complexity of issues, and expected benefit to be achieved).
118. See Wright, The Courts And The Rulemaking Process: The Limits Of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNLL L. Rzv. 375, 379 (1974).
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